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Fertility behaviour andﬁnancial development have seen dramatic changes in recent decades, both showing distinctive patterns: as
ﬁnancial development spreads worldwide, enhancing the possibility of credit and intertemporal trade for households and ﬁrms, fer-
tility shows a clear downward trend which is a cause for concern, especially in developed countries which will be facing decreasing
populations in the near future.
Do these two phenomena simply show a spurious temporal correlation or does one cause the other? Financial development may
be one of the driving forces that change fertility behaviour. Raising children requires a signiﬁcant transfer of parents' resources in the
children's favour, whichmay be driven not only by altruism, but also by the expectation that some resources will be returned during
the parents' old age: this exchange is not synchronous and requires coordination of individual actions that can be best achieved by
means of specialised institutions. Since the basic function of ﬁnancial markets is to facilitate intertemporal trade, making current con-
sumption less dependent on current income, better organised and diversiﬁed ﬁnancialmarkets wouldmake such transfers easier and
induce parents to have more children. Nevertheless, the development of ﬁnancial markets reduces the demand for children for the
purpose of receiving old age support. The impact of ﬁnancial development on fertility is therefore undetermined and should be
assessed empirically.
A glimpse at the ﬁgures involved can give an idea of the radical change that has taken place. At the world level, the fertility rate,
i.e., the average number of children per woman over her lifetime, dropped from 4.91 in 1960–1965 to 2.56 in 2005–2008, with
large differences between country groups. While more developed regions recorded a decrease from 2.67 to 1.64, the rate in lessunina.it (E. Papagni).
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indicators also reveal a similarly striking trend. For example, the ratio of private credit to GDP has risen from 0.39 to 1.14 in high in-
come countries and from 0.13 to 0.31 in LDCs. Similar patterns are followed by other ﬁnancial variables whose values measure the
breadth of opportunities for ﬁnancial investment.2
The transition from high to low fertility has been analysed in depth in the ﬁelds of economics and demography. In the literature,
the onset of a demographic transition is often ascribed to the rise in income and education and to the reduction in mortality (Galor
(2012) surveys the literature). Indeed, increasing income brings about both the rise in the opportunity cost of raising children and
an income effect which implies greater investment in the education of fewer children. Since the demographic transition often oc-
curred duringperiods of sustained economic growth, it is argued that technological progress increased the incentive for human capital
investment, causing a decline in fertility. Another important phenomenon that accompanied the fertility transitionwas the signiﬁcant
reduction in infant mortality. Whatever is the reason for having children, lower mortality should allow a smaller number of births.
Although other causes of the demographic transition have been investigated, to date no comprehensive analysis of the role of ﬁ-
nancial development has been performed.3 The objective of this paper is to produce general and reliable evidence on the effects of
borrowing constraints and opportunities for ﬁnancial investment on the choice of the number of children.
To elucidate the channels through which ﬁnancial development affects fertility, we introduce a four-period life-cycle model of
choice in which fertility is endogenous and the household cares for its children and for its parents too. In this setting young adults
might choose to borrow some resources and, when older, to save and invest in the capital market. We assume two main types of
imperfections of ﬁnancialmarkets (Pollin, 1997;McKinnon, 1973): borrowing constraints – the difﬁculties encountered by individuals
when trying to reach their optimal level of debt – and saving constraints, which pertain to the uneasiness encountered by individuals
who wish to invest their savings in a private ﬁnancial market. We show that in the context of fertility determination, this distinction
has both theoretical relevance and a signiﬁcant empirical counterpart. Themodel shows that the effect of relaxing the borrowing con-
straint on fertility depends on: (1) an investment effect, whose positive sign is due to the reduction of future resources and to a
corresponding greater investment in children, and (2) an income effect. Hence,when children are normal goods in a household's pref-
erences, fertility will unambiguously increase. Broader access to capital markets allows parents to rely less on children to fund their
old agewelfare. Nonetheless, larger savings imply lower debt in the early years of adulthood: in this case the householdwill command
a smaller amount of resources for consumption and children. Both effects imply that fertility decreases with greater opportunities for
ﬁnancial investment.4
In the econometric analysis we use a panel of 78 countries over the period 1995–2010 built by merging the data on fertility, social
and economic indicators with those that describe the level of ﬁnancial development and structure. Household access to the credit
market is approximated by two variables: the ratio of private credit to GDP and the ratio of household credit to GDP. To capture
the opportunities for ﬁnancial investment we use the ratio of domestic public debt to GDP. Government bonds are characterised by
low risk and signiﬁcant supply even in economies where more sophisticated forms of ﬁnancial investment are scant. Conﬁrmation
of this picture comes from data produced by Beck et al. (2010) who shows that the market capitalization of public bonds has ﬁgures
comparable with those of private bonds and stocks or life insurance premiums.
One of themain challenges we faced in the econometric analysis was the possible endogeneity of ﬁnancial variables in the fertility
equation. Demographic variables such as age are known to be important determinants of wealth allocation in the life cycle and of risk-
taking attitudes. These effects would seriously undermine any attempt to estimate the causal effect of ﬁnancial development on fer-
tility. Here our approach is to apply instrumental variable methods. Indeed, we use the Index of Financial Liberalisation produced by
Abiad et al. (2009) as instrumental variable for credit and saving availability. This index focuses on ﬁnancialmarkets andmeasures the
extent of liberalisationwith respect to credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership,
policies on securitiesmarkets and banking regulations. It records the evolution of the institutions that directly and indirectly affect the
development of ﬁnancial markets. Reasonably, since most of this change is due to policy interventions, it should be considered exog-
enous with respect to the dynamics of fertility.
Our empirical results indicate that both borrowing constraints and investment opportunities impact fertility, yet in opposite direc-
tions, as predicted by the theory. The estimate of the elasticity of net fertility to private credit is positive and its value is around 32%.
The econometric results are conﬁrmed when we use a better proxy of household borrowing constraints: the value of total claims of
deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP provided by Beck et al. (2012) for a cross-section of 44 countries over the period
1994–2005. Using this variable in error components 2SLS regressions we ﬁnd that the elasticity of net fertility to household credit
takes values in the interval 0.2–0.3. The effect of domestic public debt on fertility can be quantiﬁed with an elasticity that takes neg-
ative values close to 12%. These results were obtained with the estimation of a model that includes a proxy for the pension system,
which is an alternative to theﬁnancialmarket in the allocation of saving. Robustness of the econometric results to the presence of out-
liers and to possible heterogeneity of the parameters across countries was checked by the estimation of a panel quantile regression.1 The ﬁgures on fertility rates are accessible at http://data.un.org/.
2 The ﬁgures on ﬁnancial structure are accessible at World Bank website and at Ross Levine's personal website.
3 Cigno and Rosati (1992) investigate the effects of household access to capital markets on fertility in Italy, ﬁnding empirical support for a negative effect. Some ev-
idence on this issue comes from the literature onmicrocredit programmes: these studies show some controversial effects of increased ﬁnancial availability on fertility.
Nonetheless, such ﬁnancial empowerment programmes are generally aimed at very poor people living in LDCs; accordingly, the external validity of these studies is
questionable.
4 The model characterises the main relations between ﬁnancial markets and fertility choice which guide the econometric analysis, but it does not provide a general
equilibrium interpretation of the phenomenonwhichwould dealwith the endogeneity of the ﬁnancial system. Such amodel would greatly complicate the analysis and
is beyond the scope of the paper. However, in the econometricmodelwe take into account thepossible endogeneity of the proxies for borrowing and saving constraints.
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ing in high fertility countries.
The full set of estimates highlights the importance of ﬁnancial development for the explanation of fertility across theworld. Indeed,
the estimated elasticities take values comparablewith those of other fundamental variables. The net effect of ﬁnancial variables is pos-
itive since credit availability increases fertility much more than access to capital markets reduces it. Hence, our econometric analysis
suggestsﬁnancial development acted to curb thedeclining trend in reproductionwhichweobserve in recent decades across theworld.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of ﬁ-
nancial variables on fertility; Section 3 describes the model determining household intertemporal allocation of income and fertility
determination; Section 4 describes the empirical implementation of the theoretical model, speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation issues,
the data used for estimation and the corresponding results; Section 5 discusses policy implications and concludes.
2. Literature review
In the economic literature, fertility behaviour is driven by selﬁsh or altruistic motivations: adults can invest in children as an alter-
native to ﬁnancial investment and public pension, or derive pleasure from children as durable consumption goods; alternatively, par-
ents can be altruistic and caring about their children's well-being.
Themodels of theﬁrst type date back to the pioneering contribution of Leibenstein (1957) inwhich children, rather than being net
consumers of family resources, actually increase their families' lifetimewealth. Although infants are completely dependent upon their
family for their personal consumption, as they grow up they become capable of working and transferring income back to their fam-
ilies. As long as the value of resources returned by grown-up children exceeds the value of resources consumed as infants, fertility is a
ﬁnancially proﬁtable trade from the standpoints of parents and children.
Cigno (1993) analyses the model of an extended family where members are selﬁsh and follow some self-enforcing family rules
according towhich the parents lend to the children and are paid back in old age. Hence, the family is a substitute for theﬁnancialmar-
ket. When the demand for children depends on ﬁnancial returns, the availability of alternative assets becomes crucial. As ﬁnancial
markets start providing assets which offer high returns, some families would drop fertility as an investment and turn to the market
as the return on ﬁnancial assets exceeds the return on children. This hypothesis of complete substitutability between children and
ﬁnancial assets may be found in the development economics literature (Willis, 1980; Schultz, 1974; Neher, 1971) and suggests
that better access to ﬁnancialmarkets and investment opportunities would invariably lead to a decrease in planned fertility. Nonethe-
less, Razin and Sadka (1995) have shown that in a general equilibrium analysis ﬁnancial deepening does not necessarily carry a drop
in fertility. Introducing heterogeneity in preferences and technologies, as well as the basic equilibrium identity between aggregate
saving and aggregate borrowing, ﬁnancial trade opportunities allow some families to investmore inmarket assets and less in fertility,
but at the same time other families must do the opposite, thus increasing fertility. The net balance between these competing forces
may result in higher overall fertility.
A different and complementary view of the relation between ﬁnancial development and fertility choice arises frommodelswhere it
is generally assumed that parents are interested in children per se (Hotz et al., 1997; Becker and Barro, 1988;Willis, 1973; Becker and
Lewis, 1973; Becker, 1960) andmayﬁnd it proﬁtable to borrow against the future in order to ﬁnance their children's consumption and
investment in human capital. In this case, ﬁnancial deepening and credit consumption availability may induce an increase in fertility.
The empirical literature provides just a few inquiries into this topic. Cigno and Rosati (1996) develop a model of joint determina-
tion of fertility and saving in which fertility behaviour can be driven by twomutually exclusive reasons: altruism or selﬁshness. In the
ﬁrst case, altruism in the utility function runs either backwards, from parents to children, or forwards from children to parents. In the
second case, the impossibility of intertemporal trade and the decreasing value of human capital across time make fertility the only
available technology for saving for old age. Using cointegration analysis on time series data for Germany, Italy, UK and USA, the au-
thors ﬁnd evidence compatible with the selﬁsh motivation for fertility.
Cigno and Rosati (1992), employing cointegration analysis on Italian data, document a negative effect of capital market accessibil-
ity on fertility in the long run. The variable selected to proxy for ﬁnancial development is the inverse of the ratio of currency held by
the non-bank public to bank deposits. Boldrin et al. (2005) calibrate a model of fertility with social security and ﬁnancial market
imperfections to reproduce the US economy in 2000. They ﬁnd that the elasticity of fertility to better access to capital markets is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant. An alternative model by Scotese Lehr (1999) ﬁnds that ﬁnancial intermediation can inﬂuence fertility in an in-
direct fashion. In an economywith two sectors – a traditional onewith low capitalization and amodern onewith high capitalization –
an increase in the level of ﬁnancial intermediation lowers the cost of capital, driving upwages in themodern sector. Households then
reduce fertility as their members shift labour supply from the labour-intensive sector to the capital-intensive sector. Employing a
reduced-form VAR model with panel data on 87 countries from 1965 to 1980, Scotese Lehr ﬁnds that two measures of the extent
of ﬁnancial intermediation Granger-cause a drop in fertility. Speciﬁcally, the estimated elasticity of fertility with regard to the ratio
of money to GDP is−7.7% and the elasticity with regard to the ratio of private credit to GDP is−5.7%.
The link between ﬁnancial empowerment of women and fertility is also a subject of investigation in the literature on evaluation of
microcredit programmes, although in this regard the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Since most of such programmes target
women, the additional ﬁnancial resources provided tend to shift individual effort from childbearing to income-generating activities.
At the same time, thewealth effect can increase the demand for childrenwhen these are normal goods. For example, some economet-
ric studies of the Grameen Bank programme in Bangladesh (Steele et al., 2001; Schuler and Hashemi, 1994) observe an increased use
of contraceptives resulting in lower fertility, while others (Pitt et al., 1999; Schuler et al., 1997) ﬁnd that the impact of the same pro-
gramme on contraceptive use is in fact negligible.
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not provided a general framework for its analysis in the context of imperfect capitalmarkets. More speciﬁcally, previous contributions
failed to distinguish between borrowing constraints and limited access to capital markets (saving constraints). Though interlinked, these
imperfections have distinctive features and differential effects on fertility. Borrowing constraints refer to the inability of households to
receive their optimal level of loans from the ﬁnancial sector: in this case, the observed level of households' debt is lower than optimal.
Conversely, saving constraints refer to the insufﬁcient ability of the ﬁnancial sector to collect savings from households: in this case, it is
the level of savings to be suboptimal, since its ﬁnancial return is constrained to be too low. These two types of imperfections have dif-
ferent impacts along the life cycle, as typically young families are net borrowers, whereasmature families are net lenders: accordingly,
rational forward-looking fertility decisionsmust account for both imperfections. Inwhat followswe aim to show that this overlooked
distinction is crucial to understand the complex link between ﬁnancial markets and households' fertility behaviour.
3. Theory
The model represents the choices of a household over the life cycle as determined by altruistic relations in the family and by trad-
ing relations with ﬁnancial markets. We model intergenerational altruism assuming that parents care about the well-being of their
children and their parents. Adults care about consumption of their children and fund it with transfers; similarly, grown-up children
make gifts to their parents to sustain their old age consumption. This theoretical approach to altruistic preferences (Becker, 1974;
Andreoni, 1989) is fairly general and widely adopted in the literature on the demand for children (Boldrin and Jones, 2002;
Wigger, 1999; Nishimura and Zhang, 1992; Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1985).
The time sequences of household expenditure and income over the life cycle imply the need to borrow resources in the ﬁrst years
of adulthood and the incentive to save and invest in the capital market later on. Capital markets can be perfect, meaning that house-
holds can borrow and save the optimal amounts consistent with their intertemporal budget constraint. Several forms of imperfec-
tions, nonetheless, may limit credit availability to households with signiﬁcant consequences on their decisions. Similarly,
opportunities for ﬁnancial investment can be scarce in economies where property rights are not well enforced and informational
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers are severe. This situation has been termed a savings constraint in the literature
(Pollin, 1997) and refers to the adverse role on savings played by a low level of ﬁnancial deepening (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw,
1973). In this case, investing in children is an alternative to poor ﬁnancial market conditions.
In what follows, for expository convenience, we ﬁrst present the model with perfect ﬁnancial markets, and then we turn to the
distinct cases of borrowing constraints and limited access to capital markets. Though real economies often present both types of mar-
ket imperfections, this expository strategy affords a better understanding of the consequences of each kind of market failure on fer-
tility choice.
3.1. Timing and budget constraints
A household lives for four periods: it is young in the ﬁrst, young adult in the second, adult in the third, and old in the fourth. Chil-
dren are born during their parents' young adulthood and neither work nor have resources; they live with their parents who spend
some resources to rear them. Young adults work and take care of their nt children during the ﬁrst period of adulthood; they still
work when adult and take care of their old parents; they retire when old. The choice problem starts in the second period of life
and spans the three remaining periods. The life-cycle utility function of a household member who is a young adult at date t is:5 Altr
sumptioU ¼ v c1t ;nt
 
þ u c2tþ1; c3tþ1
 
þ g c3tþ2
 
; ð1Þwhere superscript denotes the period of life (0, 1, 2, 3), ct1 is consumption during early adulthood, nt is the number of children, ct+ 12 is
consumption during late adulthood, ct+ 23 is consumption during old age, and ct+ 13 is consumption of the parents during their own old
age. The functions v(⋅),u(⋅), g(⋅) are strictly concave and satisfy Inada conditions. Assuming that household utility is increasing in each
argument, two of them represent altruism in the family: children (nt) and old parents' consumption (ct + 13 ), implying forward and
backward altruism, respectively.5
During each period, choices are constrained by intertemporal and intratemporal requirements according to the following
schedule:
• In the second period of their life ((Eq. (1)) agents become adult and start working, get married, become parents, and use debt to
ﬁnance their consumption and the cost of their children which includes consumption and other expenditures (e.g., education,
health); they may face borrowing constraints. The budget constraint is:c1t ¼ 1−τntð Þw1t þ Dt ð2Þwhere τ is the cost of raising one child as a share of the labour income, wt1, and Dt is the amount of debt.uistic parents take care of both the number and consumption of children. In what follows, we adopt the standard simplifying assumption that children con-
n is given exogenously.
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parents by transferring money to them. At the beginning of the same period, the children leave parental house and start working.
The budget constraint is:6 Wit
enoughc2tþ1 ¼ w2tþ1−Rtþ1Dt−qtþ1−stþ1 ð3Þwherewt+ 12 is labour income,Rt+ 1≡ 1+ rt+ 1 and rt+ 1 is the interest rate, qt+ 1 is amoney transfer towards parents, and st+ 1 is the
value of saving.
During the same time period the agent's parents face the following budget constraint:c3tþ1 ¼ Rtþ1st þ nt−1qtþ1 ð4Þwhere qt + 1 is the amount of transfers received by the parents from each child.
• In the fourth period ((Eq. (3)) agents do not work because of their old age. They live on payments from previous ﬁnancial invest-
ments and possibly from transfers from their children. The budget constraint isc3tþ2 ¼ Rtþ2stþ1 þ ntqtþ2 ð5Þwhere qt + 2 is the amount of transfers received by parents from each child.
3.2. The optimal choice
The young adult optimisation programme consists inmaximising the utility function ((Eq. (1))with respect to life-cycle consump-
tion, the number of children, and parents' consumption, subject to the budget constraints (Eqs. (2)–(5)). Following the literature
(e.g., Lagerlöf (1997); Nishimura and Zhang (1992)), we assume that the household maximises its utility taking future decisions of
the children as given. The optimality conditions characterise the trade-off between the household's consumption in different ages.
The adult also chooses the gift for her/his parent by equating themarginal increase of utility she/he derives from greater parent's con-
sumption to the marginal utility cost, which is equally shared with siblings. Similarly, the optimal choice of the number of children
follows from the balance between the marginal cost of a child in terms of utility and two marginal beneﬁts: the ﬁrst derives from
greater child consumption and the second from the increase in the parent's future consumption due to ﬁnancial support.6 By the
same token, household optimal choices imply that the gross rate of return on children – the ratio between the value of the gift divided
by the cost of a child net of the beneﬁt in terms of current consumption – is equal to the rate of return on ﬁnancial investment:qtþ2
τw1t−
∂v=∂nt
∂v=∂c1t
¼ Rtþ1Rtþ2: ð6ÞThemodel accounts for some of themost important features of adult life and highlights how they are affected by ﬁnancialmarkets.
When these markets work perfectly, the optimal decisions of the parents can be fully realized. In this respect, further insights come
from the comparative statics of nt with respect to some of the most important parameters. Proofs of the results are in the appendix.
The comparative statics effect of wages on fertility can be split into two parts. The ﬁrst represents the cost of children and is neg-
ative. The second part is a combination between the standard income effect (positive when children are normal goods) and the neg-
ative effect of incomeon the decision to invest in children. Greater support from the children to the parents has two effects on fertility:
qt + 2 increases nt since it modiﬁes the trade-off betweenmarginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of fertility by increasing the return from
investing in children, while the same change in qt + 2 has income effects which are similar to those already discussed.
An increase in the interest rate has several effects on nt. As theﬁnancial alternative to investment in children yields a higher return,
fertility becomesmore costly. In addition, the household faces stronger incentives to shift expenditure from current items, ct1, nt, to the
future ct + 12 , ct + 13 , ct + 23 . The income effect of the interest rate depends on the net ﬁnancial position of the household, which can bor-
rowmore than the amount it saves, or just the opposite. The resulting effect depends on the balance between the two income effects
we identiﬁed in the discussion of the effect of wages on fertility.
Now, suppose that households cannot borrow against the future the desired amount of resources, since they undergo rationing in
ﬁnancial markets. This additional constraint prevents expenditure on children and consumption of young adults from exceeding the
total amount of resources available during the ﬁrst period of adulthood:c1t ¼ 1−τntð Þw1t þ Dt ð7ÞwhereDt is the highest amount of resources that can be borrowed, exogenously given. The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem re-
semble those found in the case without borrowing constraint. As shown in appendix, the inﬂuence of wt1 on nt can be interpreted inh regard to the trade-off between private consumption and fertility at time t, we assume that τwt1 N qt + 2/(Rt + 1Rt + 2), i.e., that child rearing costs are large
to forbid annihilation of consumption. This condition obtains an internally signiﬁcant solution for fertility (nt b ∞).
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the gift qt + 2 on nt. If the gift from each child increases, then parents can obtain the desired old age consumption by raising fewer
children.
Higher credit availability will impact on household fertility according to two causal effects. As the value of D grows –more credit
is available to households – young parents command a greater amount of their future resources, and spend these resources on con-
sumption and children. Since children are normal goods in household preferences then nt will increase. Furthermore, the same in-
crease in D means less income available for consumption during retirement. Hence, the household will react by increasing
investment in children, i.e., raising the number of children nt.7 Both effects imply that the sign of dnt dDt is positive.
Since children can also provide support for their retired parents, fertility becomes crucial in determining the optimal amount of
saving.We analyse themodel of household choice by assuming that the optimal desired value of saving st+ 1 is higher than the ceiling
stþ1. Hence, adults face the following constraint:7 If th
of her c
the rele
8 Our
constra
resultinc3tþ2 ¼ Rtþ2stþ1 þ ntqtþ2; ð8Þwhich shows that both ﬁnancial investment and children contribute to ensure old age consumption. When the savings constraint is
binding while household borrowing is not restricted, the life-cycle utility maximisation programme highlights the consequences of
greater access to ﬁnancial investment.
Again, the analysis of the effects of labour incomeon fertility can follow the lines of the preceding cases. The same can be said of the
effects of qt + 2 and R on nt. According to comparative statics, fertility decreases with stþ1. Indeed, there is a trade-off between the in-
vestment in children and that in ﬁnancial activities since greater ﬁnancial investment opportunities reduce the need to raise children
for old age consumption. Furthermore, given the intertemporal budget constraint, whenstþ1 increases, young adults reduce their debt.
As a result, their resources will be lower and fertility will drop.
In summary, our model suggests that improved access to credit induces households to have more children, while fertility unam-
biguously decreases with easier access to capital markets.8 In the following section, we search for econometric evidence consistent
with these predictions of the model.
4. Empirical analysis
The econometric exercise is carried out to ﬁnd evidence for an economically signiﬁcant impact of ﬁnancial markets on fertility be-
haviour. In our estimateswe use an unbalanced panel of ﬁve-year time series covering the period 1995–2010 for amaximumnumber
of countries equal to 78. We ﬁrst introduce our empirical speciﬁcation, then turn to data description, and ﬁnally show various esti-
mates along with some robustness checks.
4.1. Model speciﬁcation
Our theoreticalmodel predicts that desired fertility should be responsive, in opposite directions, both to borrowing constraints and
to opportunities to access the capital markets. This feature is peculiar to our approach, since the literature does not distinguish be-
tween different sources of imperfections in ﬁnancial markets.
The focus of our analysis is the number of surviving children, and the dependent variable of the econometricmodel should correct-
ly approximate for desired fertility. In many countries infant/child mortality is not negligible, and may cause a signiﬁcant difference
between the number of births and the number of surviving children. In this respect, the use of the total fertility rate should be accom-
panied by the inclusion of childmortality among the explanatory variables. However,mortality variables are generally considered en-
dogenous to fertility. The literature on the effect of child mortality on fertility deals with endogeneity with the selection of
instrumental variables useful to reduce the bias in parameter estimates. However, the search is arduous and there is no broad agree-
ment on the proposed instrumental variables. Furthermore, the role of child mortality in the demographic transition has been
questioned in the recent debate (Galor, 2012). Indeed, theory clearly states that if parents appreciate surviving children, when
mortality declines they reduce the number of births, leaving desired fertility unchanged. This could not be the case if survival were
uncertain and parents had a precautionary demand for children. The evidence on the relevance of this theoretical hypothesis
seems quite scant (Doepke (2005); Galor (2012)). In the context of this paper, the endogeneity of mortality would add to those of
ﬁnancial variables and per capita GDP,making the econometric analysis really hard. This is themain reasonwhywe choose to approx-
imate net fertility with the net reproduction rate (NRR). According to the deﬁnition of the United Nations, NRR is: “The average num-
ber of daughters a hypothetical cohort of womenwould have at the end of their reproductive period if they were subject during their
whole lives to the fertility rates and themortality rates of a given period. It is expressed as number of daughters per woman.” The useemodel allowed for the quantity/quality trade-off, the parent could react to less resources during old age reducing fertility and investingmore in the education
hildren. This extension of themodel would greatly complicate the derivation of comparative statics results; nonetheless, in the literature there is no evidence of
vance of old age security hypothesis for the increase in education occurring in developing countries.
model does not consider the case for bequests from parents to children. This extension of the model would not change the sign of the effect of released credit
ints on the young adult resources, hence on fertility. However, it would imply that the old age security hypothesis does not hold for obvious reasons. The
g model would miss an important part of the explanation of fertility trends in the world.
166 V. Filoso, E. Papagni / European Journal of Political Economy 37 (2015) 160–177of NRR as an alternative to the total fertility rate is common in the literature and is the choice of Scotese Lehr (2009) and Angeles
(2010) among others.9
In what follows, we assume that the parameters qt + 2 and τ differ across countries, but stay constant across time for each country.
From the empirical point of view, fertility choice is deeply intertwined with a large number of economic and social variables. Many of
these variables are unobservable in the publicly available data collections while others are intrinsically non-dimensional, like those
related to deeply rooted mental habits, cultural inﬂuences, religious traditions, and the like. Given that these variables change only
slowly, the ﬁxed-effect panel estimator is the elective method of estimation. Accordingly, we formulate the empirical model:9 Tho
straight
10 In p
sion resNRRi;t ¼ β0 þ BOR0i;tβ1 þ FIN0i;tβ2 þ X0i;tβ3 þ ui þ ϕt þ εi;t ð9Þwhere BOR is a vector of variables used to approximate the ease of access to borrowing, FIN is a vector of variables describing the de-
velopment of investment opportunities in capitalmarkets, X is a set of variableswhich account for themain determinants of fertility, u
is a country-speciﬁc, time-unvarying, random variable potentially correlatedwith the explanatory variables, ϕ is a time effect, and ε is
a scalar disturbance termwith E[ε]= 0. The subscript i is for countries, while t is for time periods. Each time observation is the average
of the value of a given variable over a non-overlapping ﬁve-year period. The set of controls X includes per capita GDP, female andmale
education, and the rate of urbanisation.10 This set also includes a proxy of the availability of public pension programmes. Indeed, in
many countries, governments provide elders with publicly funded pensions ﬁnanced through a pay-as-you-go system. This intergen-
erational transfer is made up by taxation on youths and a corresponding transfer to elders. Public pension systems diminish the need
to access private ﬁnancial markets for old age support, resulting at least in a partial offset of freely-chosen savings. In this context, the
inclusion of somemeasure of public pensions in Eq. (9) could bring about a lower or negligible coefﬁcient for private ﬁnancialmarkets.
Hence, the observed correlation between ﬁnancial opportunities and fertility would simply mask a genuine causal relation running
frompublic pensions to fertility. In our econometric analysis of cross-country fertility, other important control variables are the public
expenditure on children (CHILDRENEXP) (see, e.g., Borck and Wrohlich (2011)) and the share of people who adhere to Catholic
(CATHOLICS) and Islamic (MUSLIMS) religions. Data on these variables refer to one time period only, and we use them in random ef-
fects IV estimates.
The hypothesis that ﬁnancial variables are endogenous to the NRR is of paramount importance in model estimation. Indeed, the
rate of population change modiﬁes the age structure which is one of the determinants of the allocation of assets in the life cycle.
Age affects household portfolio choice through inﬂuence on the degree of risk aversion. If household preferences change over time
then the birth year could have similar consequences on ﬁnancial decisions.
Instrumental variable methods allow unbiased parameter estimates when variables strongly correlated with the endogenous var-
iables and uncorrelated with the model error are used as instruments. We instrument the variables approximating for credit and ﬁ-
nancial investmentwith the Index of Financial Liberalisation (FINREFORM) produced at IMF (Abiad et al., 2009). The recent history of
the ﬁnancial sector in developed and developing countries highlights the importance of state intervention until a diffused process of
liberalisation and deregulation took place starting from the early 1980s. Previously, the state had an important role in the ownership
of banks and the allocation of credit was strongly regulated. Entry barriers restricted the supply of ﬁnancial services and limited com-
petition. Liberalisation of ﬁnancial markets was the outcome of policy reforms implemented by governments in many countries.
Often, those reforms were caused by events like economic crises, the formation of a new government, and the intervention of inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions (Abiad and Mody, 2005). Hence, ﬁnancial liberalisation can be considered exogenous to the choice of
fertility.
The process of ﬁnancial liberalisation can be interpreted in a political economy framework where a policy reform can be favoured
by some interest groups, which face the opposition of other groups who gain more in the status quo (Burgoon et al., 2012). In this
context, the quality of political institutions affects the likelihood of reforms in ﬁnancial markets. In the same framework, Rajan and
Zingales (2003) show that the opposition to ﬁnancial liberalisation can be weakened by openness to trade and to capital ﬂows. We
agree with Rajan and Zingales and use the ratio between foreign trade and GDP (TRADE) as an instrumental variable for credit con-
straints and access to ﬁnancial investment.
The econometric model allows for the likely endogeneity of per capita GDP as a consequence of reverse causality from the dynam-
ics of population to economic growth. Hence, we add to the set of IVs the inﬂation rate (INFLATION), the index of investment freedom
(INVESTFREEDOM)of theHeritage Foundation and the ratio of foreign trade toGDP. Theﬁrst variable captures the impact ofmonetary
policy on the economy, while openness is one of the main determinants of economic growth, as well as the constraints to private in-
vestment. We also expect signiﬁcant effects of FINREFORM on GDP per capita because they are well documented in the literature.
4.2. Data description
The dependent variable in our regressions is the net reproduction rate which we take from the United Nations, World Population
Prospects 2010.ugh our theoretical model is developed under the assumption that planned and actual fertility coincide, to allow for discrepancies between them would be a
forward mathematical extension. For an example see Azarnert (2006).
reliminary estimates the set of controls included the real interest rate, but its parameter was always not signiﬁcant. Hence, in the following, we present regres-
ults from models excluding the interest rate.
Table 1
Description of variables.
Availability
Variable Description/source From Until
NRR Log of net reproduction rate: number of children born to an average woman
over her reproductive years
1995 2010
United Nations (2010)
GDP Log of per capita gross domestic product (2005's PPP units) 1995 2010
URBAN Log of urbanisation rate 1995 2010
INFLATION Inﬂation rate, consumer prices (annual percent change) 1995 2010
TRADE Foreign trade (percentage of GDP) 1995 2010
The World Bank (2010), World Development Indicators
SCHOOLINGFEM Log of average years of schooling of women aged 15 and over 1995 2010
SCHOOLINGMAL Log of average years of schooling of men aged 15 and over 1995 2010
Barro and Lee (2010)
CATHOLICS Percentage of catholics in the population 2000 2000
MUSLIMS Percentage of Muslims in the population 2000 2000
Barro (2003)
PRIVCRED Log of total private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, deﬂated 1995 2010
Beck et al. (2000)
DEBT Log of public sector's domestic debt to GDP 1995 2007
Panizza (2008)
SSECURITY Social security payments to GDP 1995 2010
CHILDRENEXP Children expenditure to GDP 1995 2010
ILO, The Social Security Expenditure Database
SHAREGOVCONS Log of share of government consumption at current PPPsc 1995 2005
Penn World Table, version 8.0
FINREFORM Index of ﬁnancial reforms 1995 2005
Abiad et al. (2009)
HOUSECRED Log of total outstanding claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP Average 1994–2005
Beck et al. (2012)
INVESTFREEDOM Freedom of investment 1995 2010
Heritage Foundation (2012)
167V. Filoso, E. Papagni / European Journal of Political Economy 37 (2015) 160–177The econometric model includes the main determinants of fertility (e.g., Ehrlich and Kim (2007); Schultz (1997)). Five variables
approximate for the system of incentives faced by households in the choice of fertility. Data on the GDP per capita in 2005 purchasing
parity units (GDP) come from theWorld Bank,World Development Indicators 2010 (WDI). The average years of schooling of women
(SCHOOLINGFEM) and the average years of schooling of men (SCHOOLINGMAL), both aged 15 and over, are from the dataset of Barro
and Lee (2010). As a proxy of public pensions we consider the ratio of public social protection (excluding health) expenditure to GDP
(SSECURITY).11 The source of these data is the IMF and they are available at the site of the International Labour Ofﬁce for the years
1995–2007.We also include in some speciﬁcations the variable CHILDRENEXP. This variable accounts for the public social protection
expenditure on beneﬁts for children as a percentage of GDP. Data are released by the ILO for the years from 2008 to 2011. Given the
sparse nature of this variable, in the estimates we consider this variable time unvarying and apply random effects panel methods. The
social and economic characteristics of the environment relevant to reproduction are approximated by the rate of urbanisation
(URBAN), drawn from the World Bank, WDI 2010, and by the variables CATHOLICS and MUSLIMS that refer to the year 2000 and
are from Barro (2003).
Access to ﬁnancial markets is approximated by three variables. Following the literature on other household choices (e.g., savings
and education, Loayza et al. (2000); De Gregorio (1996)), we use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP
(PRIVCRED) as a proxy for borrowing constraints. Data on this variable come from the Financial Development and Structure Database
of the World Bank Research Department (Beck et al. (2000)). While private credit includes credit to the business sector, Beck et al.
(2012) provide the ratio of household credit (HOUSECRED) to GDP for 45 countries averaged over the years 1994–2005. We use
this better proxy for access to credit as a robustness check of our regression results.
To capture the degree of development of the other side of capital markets, namely ﬁnancial investment, we use data on one of the
most popular forms of investment: public bonds. Indeed, often countrieswhere ﬁnancialmarketsﬁnd theminimal conditions for their
existence see the signiﬁcant presence of assets issued by the public administration, as shownby Beck et al. (2010). Actually, the supply
of public bonds is favoured by the considerable size of state assets in every modern economy and the consequent low risk of default
which attracts awide public of risk-averse savers. The sustained andwidespread growth of public expenditureworldwide afterWorld
War II was anothermajor reason for the increase in the share of public bonds on ﬁnancial markets. However, public bonds can also be
sold to foreign institutions. Hence, external public debt cannot be used to approximate the range of ﬁnancial investment opportunities
available to domestic households.We use the data from Panizza (2008) to obtain the ratio of domestic public debt held by residents to
GDP (DEBT) for more than 100 countries in the years from 1990 to 2007.11 For a comprehensive survey on the economic and political factors shaping modern social security systems see Galasso and Profeta (2002).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Quartiles
Variable N Mean σ Min Max 25% 50% 75%
NRR 574 0.19 0.43 −0.90 1.04 −0.16 0.18 0.59
GDP 529 8.60 1.27 5.62 11.26 7.57 8.65 9.61
URBAN 606 3.89 0.53 2.03 4.61 3.55 4.03 4.30
INFLATION 494 0.08 0.11 −0.37 0.99 0.03 0.05 0.08
TRADE 539 90.24 49.96 0.67 422.02 56.68 80.05 112.27
SCHOOLINGFEM 432 2.05 0.44 0.51 2.62 1.82 2.19 2.36
SCHOOLINGMAL 432 1.97 0.43 0.05 2.55 1.77 2.09 2.27
CATHOLICS 342 0.30 0.33 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.11 0.58
MUSLIMS 342 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.04 0.39
PRIVCRED 459 0.33 0.25 0.02 1.31 0.13 0.27 0.48
DEBT 337 2.80 1.02 0.00 4.80 2.18 2.95 3.56
SSECURITY 217 9.54 6.85 0.01 24.32 3.20 9.26 15.58
CHILDRENEXP 264 0.97 1.07 0.00 4.15 0.13 0.54 1.46
SHAREGOVCONS 501 0.20 0.11 −0.00 0.78 0.13 0.17 0.25
FINREFORM 270 13.74 4.77 0.81 21.00 10.40 14.10 17.60
HOUSECRED 135 0.28 0.24 0.03 0.99 0.08 0.18 0.42
INVESTFREEDOM 496 51.33 18.91 10.00 90.00 35.00 50.00 70.00
168 V. Filoso, E. Papagni / European Journal of Political Economy 37 (2015) 160–177The following variables are used as instruments. The Index of Financial Liberalisation (FINREFORM) is constructed by Abiad et al.
(2009) as the sum of seven components measuring reforms in credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry
barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, banking regulations and restrictions on the capital account. Data refer to 91
countries over the period 1973–2005. INVESTFREEDOM is one of the components of the Index of Economic Freedom produced by The
Heritage Foundation. The set of IV is completed by two variables drawn fromWDI: the inﬂation rate, and the ratio of foreign trade to
GDP.
The dependent variable NRR and all the explanatory variables but SSECURITY, are expressed in logarithms.
The sources and description of the data of each variable are reported in Table 1, while basic statistics and a correlation matrix are
reported respectively in Table 2 and in Table 3. The reported ﬁgures are for the complete sample, while the various subsamples used
for estimation are made up of observations for which thewhole set of variables – dependent and independent – are non-missing. Ac-
cordingly, each estimation table reports the number of countries and the number of observations included in the calculation.Table 3
Cross-correlations.
Time-varying variables net of ﬁxed effects.
NRR 1.000
SCHOOLINGFEM −0.438 1.000
(0.000)
SCHOOLINGMAL −0.407 0.993 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
URBAN −0.437 0.632 0.623 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SSECURITY −0.329 0.184 0.154 0.028 1.000
(0.000) (0.046) (0.096) (0.761)
GDP −0.025 0.549 0.548 0.364 −0.134 1.000
(0.788) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.148)
PRIVCRED 0.252 0.198 0.191 0.107 −0.244 0.698 1.000
(0.006) (0.031) (0.039) (0.247) (0.008) (0.000)
DEBT −0.411 0.188 0.200 0.117 0.169 −0.173 −0.302 1.000
(0.000) (0.042) (0.030) (0.208) (0.068) (0.061) (0.001)
INFLATION −0.003 −0.170 −0.174 −0.208 0.004 −0.481 −0.246 0.256 1.000
(0.970) (0.066) (0.059) (0.024) (0.963) (0.000) (0.007) (0.005)
TRADE −0.196 0.393 0.384 0.270 0.110 0.578 0.271 0.206 −0.141 1.000
(0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.236) (0.000) (0.003) (0.025) (0.128)
INVESTFREEDOM 0.337 −0.506 −0.502 −0.334 −0.011 −0.195 0.188 −0.118 0.161 −0.185 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.910) (0.035) (0.042) (0.205) (0.081) (0.045)
FINREFORM −0.276 0.616 0.614 0.409 0.013 0.834 0.557 0.037 −0.471 0.544 −0.281 1.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.892) (0.000) (0.000) (0.687) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
SHAREGOVCONS −0.057 −0.254 −0.243 −0.196 0.244 −0.549 −0.364 0.085 0.428 −0.291 0.270 −0.538 1.000
(0.543) (0.006) (0.008) (0.034) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Notes — The table reports the unconditional correlation coefﬁcients between the variables. Probability values in parentheses.
Table 4
Fixed effects estimation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.075 0.003 0.114 0.019
(1.142) (0.035) (1.547) (0.210)
SCHOOLINGFEM −0.703 −0.546 −1.044 −0.837
(−0.809) (−0.633) (−1.124) (−0.935)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0.454 0.379 0.917 0.774
(0.490) (0.416) (0.914) (0.802)
URBAN −0.464** −0.512** −0.260 −0.255
(−2.370) (−2.275) (−1.219) (−1.057)
SSECURITY −0.007 −0.008 −0.010** −0.012***
(−1.373) (−1.453) (−2.298) (−2.831)
PRIVCRED 0.146** 0.148**
(2.435) (2.007)
DEBT −0.051** −0.044
(−2.233) (−1.578)
Statistics
Observations 201 195 158 152
Countries 78 76 70 68
R2 within 0.319 0.381 0.433 0.497
F test prob. for time dummies 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes— Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Temporal dummies are included. Country-clustered Student's t in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance aster-
isks: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 5
Instrumental variables estimation.
MODELS
A B C D E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GMM LIML GMM LIML GMM LIML GMM LIML EC2SLS
GDP −0.079 −0.074 −0.173* −0.186 −0.098 −0.127 −0.270** −0.268** −0.316**
(−0.894) (−0.794) (−1.647) (−1.616) (−1.132) (−1.299) (−2.217) (−1.961) (−2.278)
SCHOOLINGMAL 1.885** 2.223** 2.033** 2.136** 3.066** 3.119** 2.966** 3.253** 0.906
(1.996) (2.266) (2.054) (2.096) (2.062) (2.085) (2.083) (2.210) (0.734)
SCHOOLINGFEM −2.029** −2.327** −1.990** −2.082** −3.109** −3.167** −2.831** −3.062** −1.165
(−2.314) (−2.558) (−2.146) (−2.173) (−2.328) (−2.353) (−2.187) (−2.294) (−1.023)
URBAN −0.447* −0.524** −0.860*** −0.821*** −0.224 −0.108 −0.519* −0.506* −0.158
(−1.766) (−1.983) (−3.169) (−2.947) (−0.660) (−0.296) (−1.721) (−1.689) (−0.665)
SSECURITY −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.006 0.006
(−0.493) (−0.506) (−0.496) (−0.328) (−1.010) (−0.925) (−0.813) (−1.070) (0.936)
PRIVCRED 0.300*** 0.326** 0.323** 0.288 0.337*
(2.759) (2.539) (2.354) (1.604) (1.949)
DEBT −0.124*** −0.118*** −0.137*** −0.115*** −0.140***
(−3.902) (−3.069) (−4.222) (−2.632) (−4.353)
CHILDRENEXP 0.049
(0.840)
CATHOLICS 0.107
(0.670)
MUSLIMS −0.252
(−0.852)
Dummy for years 2005–2010 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.038*** 0.036** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.045** 0.049*** 0.034
(5.051) (5.006) (2.818) (2.353) (3.078) (3.096) (2.575) (2.614) (1.625)
Dummy for OECD high income country 0.031
(0.129)
Statistics
Observations 155 155 149 149 117 117 111 111 77
Countries 57 57 55 55 47 47 45 45 36
Notes—Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate.Models A–D are estimatedwith GMMand LIMLwith country-clustered Student's t in parentheses.Model E is
estimated with Error Components 2SLS with bootstrapped Student's t in parentheses. Model A includes as instruments for GDP: INFLATION, TRADE, and FINREFORM.
Model B includes as instruments for GDP and PRIVCRED: INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. Model C includes as instruments for GDP and DEBT:
INFLATION, INFLATION2, TRADE, and FINREFORM. Model D includes as instruments for GDP, PRIVCRED, and DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, TRADE, FINREFORM, and
INVESTFREEDOM. Model E includes as instruments for GDP, PRIVCRED, and DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, TRADE, log of TRADE, FINREFORM, log of FINREFORM,
and INVESTFREEDOM. Model E also includes as additional controls the percentage of catholics and the percentage of muslims. Statistical signiﬁcance asterisks:
* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
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Table 6
Instrumental variables estimation.
Diagnostic tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GMM LIML GMM LIML GMM LIML GMM LIML RNDM
Observations 155 155 149 149 117 117 111 111 77
Countries 57 57 55 55 47 47 45 45 36
R2 within 0.306 0.313 0.388 0.371 0.322 0.316 0.304 0.388
A. Hansen's J
Statistic 2.688 2.619 2.570 2.425 0.742 0.739 1.183 1.136 15.609
p-Value 0.261 0.270 0.277 0.298 0.690 0.691 0.554 0.567 0.552
C. Anderson–Rubin Wald test
χ2 statistic 4.933 4.933 17.707 17.707 23.031 23.031 34.837 34.837
p-Value 0.177 0.177 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
D. Angrist–Pischke test for GDP
F statistic 38.577 38.577 33.214 33.214 28.550 28.550 9.766 9.766
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
χ2 statistic 123.406 123.406 107.288 107.288 93.996 93.996 32.634 32.634
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
E. Angrist–Pischke test for log of private credit/GDP
F statistic 12.230 12.230 9.438 9.438
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
χ2 statistic 39.506 39.506 31.538 31.538
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F. Angrist–Pischke test for log of debt/GDP
F statistic 18.152 18.152 15.574 15.574
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
χ2 statistic 59.762 59.762 52.042 52.042
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes— The statistical tests in each column refer to the corresponding columns in Table 5. Stock–Yogo's critical values for Angrist–Pischke F test of weak identiﬁcation:
Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 at 10% maximal LIML size 6.46; Model 1 at 5%maximal IV relative bias 13.91; Models 3 and 7 at 10% maximal IV relative bias 9.08; Model 5 at 5%
maximal IV relative bias 16.85.
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The model is estimated under different speciﬁcations and with different methods. Speciﬁcations start from the basic equation, to
which we add PRIVCRED and DEBT. We estimate a panel ﬁxed effects model using OLS and two IV methods: two-step Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) and Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML). OLS, GMM and LIML adopt clustered by country
robust estimators of the standard errors of the model.12
Table 4 presents the OLS ﬁxed effects estimates of several models. Among the most important determinants of the net reproduc-
tion rate we ﬁnd the ratio of private credit to GDP that shows a signiﬁcant positive effect with an elasticity of 15%. The variables DEBT
and SSECURITY have signiﬁcant parameter estimates with a negative sign as expected. The estimate of the elasticity of NRR to DEBT is
−5.1%.
The endogeneity of per capita GDP and the ﬁnancial variables is addressed with IV estimates presented in Table 5. GMM provides
efﬁcient parameter estimates – i.e., with minimum asymptotic variance – under general heteroskedasticity. The LIML estimator is a
useful alternative because it is more robust to the presence of weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005), although it assumes i.i.d. er-
rors. Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the same speciﬁcations of Table 4 with GMM and LIML. Table 6 provides a large set
of statistics useful for the evaluation of IV estimates. The results of the ﬁrst-stage regression for the model with PRIVCRED and the
model with DEBT are in Table 7.
In the IV regression results, the basicmodel of fertility is conﬁrmed and reinforced. Indeed, almost in every speciﬁcation the school-
ing variables and the rate of urbanisation show signiﬁcant and sizeable parameters. Per capita GDP conﬁrms theminor role it displays
in OLS estimates, which is not peculiar to this paper. The model which includes PRIVCRED among regressors is estimated with GMM
and LIML using INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM as instruments for the endogenous variables per capita GDP
and PRIVCRED. It is worth noting the small difference of GMMwith respect to LIML parameter estimates, notwithstanding the lack
of robustness to heteroskedasticity of the latter estimationmethod. The parameter of PRIVCRED is still signiﬁcant and positive, show-
ing a value around0.32, greater than theOLS estimate. The positive effect of instrumenting PRIVCRED on its parameter estimate can be
explained as the effect of measurement error due to the statistical content of the variable that includes not just credit to households,
but credit to the business sector too. Instrumental variables may correct the attenuation effect in OLS estimates. In the following we
will present the estimation results of a model that includes a measure of credit to households.
The results of the IV estimation of the effect of access to ﬁnancial investment on net fertility are presented in Table 5. The set of
instruments for GDP and DEBT includes the variables: INFLATION, INFLATION squared, TRADE, and FINREFORM. The addition of the
ratio of domestic public debt to GDP to the basic model provides a test of the theory in Section 3. Indeed, IV estimates conﬁrm the12 The computation was conducted using the STATA command xtivreg2 (Baum et al., 2003).
Table 7
Instrumental variable estimation.
First stage estimates.
Models
Correspondence to Tables 5 and 6 Columns 3–4 Columns 5–6
Estimation technique→ GMM LIML GMM LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endogenous variables→ GDP PRIVCRED GDP PRIVCRED GDP DEBT GDP DEBT
SCHOOLINGFEM 0.592 1.330 0.592 1.330 1.045 −8.149 1.045 −8.149
(0.409) (0.889) (0.409) (0.889) (0.523) (−1.212) (0.523) (−1.212)
SCHOOLINGMAL −0.076 −1.181 −0.076 −1.181 −0.500 10.667 −0.500 10.667
(−0.050) (−0.771) (−0.050) (−0.771) (−0.244) (1.494) (−0.244) (1.494)
URBAN −0.388 −0.112 −0.388 −0.112 −0.378 −0.319 −0.378 −0.319
(−1.356) (−0.317) (−1.356) (−0.317) (−1.220) (−0.232) (−1.220) (−0.232)
SSECURITY −0.017*** −0.021** −0.017*** −0.021** −0.026*** 0.045 −0.026*** 0.045
(−3.074) (−2.655) (−3.074) (−2.655) (−2.965) (1.598) (−2.965) (1.598)
TRADE 0.002** −0.002 0.002** −0.002
(2.028) (−1.483) (2.028) (−1.483)
FINREFORM 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.023*** −0.041* 0.023*** −0.041*
(5.632) (3.478) (5.632) (3.478) (3.825) (−1.930) (3.825) (−1.930)
INFLATION −0.444*** −0.108 −0.444*** −0.108 −0.807** −2.849 −0.807** −2.849
(−4.047) (−1.388) (−4.047) (−1.388) (−2.275) (−1.634) (−2.275) (−1.634)
INFLATION2 0.555 5.870*** 0.555 5.870***
(1.318) (2.726) (1.318) (2.726)
INVESTFREE 0.002** 0.007*** 0.002** 0.007*** 0.004*** −0.001 0.004*** −0.001
(2.316) (5.469) (2.316) (5.469) (3.086) (−0.173) (3.086) (−0.173)
Log of TRADE 0.046 1.492*** 0.046 1.492***
(0.441) (3.242) (0.441) (3.242)
Dummy for years 2005−2010 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.167*** −0.205** 0.167*** −0.205**
(5.628) (5.700) (5.628) (5.700) (5.745) (−2.312) (5.745) (−2.312)
Statistics
Observations 149 149 149 149 111 111 111 111
Countries 55 55 55 55 45 45 45 45
Notes— Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Standard error in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance asterisks: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
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The joint signiﬁcance of the parameters of PRIVCRED and DEBT provides support to one of the main results of the theory that main-
tains borrowing constraints and access to ﬁnancial investment have quite distinct effects on household behaviour and fertility. When
the model includes both DEBT and PRIVCRED, the estimated elasticity of DEBT amounts to around−13%, while the same elasticity
remains close to 30% for PRIVCRED. The model in the last column of Table 5 displays the results of the estimates with the inclusion
of the controls CHILDRENEXP, CATHOLICS, MUSLIMS and a dummy variable for high-incomeOECD countries to the set of explanatory
variables. Because these variables do not vary over time, we apply the two-stage least-squares error-components model (EC2SLS)
proposed by Baltagi (1981). The main results of model estimation remain robust after the enlargement of the set of explanatory
variables.
The reliability of the results of IV estimation depends on several hypotheses which underlie the use of GMM and LIML methods.
Table 6 presents the statistics of some tests of the general speciﬁcation and the quality of instrumental variables. The Sargan–Hansen
J statistic is a general test of speciﬁcation that under the null maintains the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. In the case of
EC2SLS, this statistic also tests the hypothesis of random effects. The values of the J statistic in Table 6 show that the speciﬁcations can-
not be rejected. Furthermore, a recent strand of the econometric literature highlights the risks involved in the use of excluded instru-
ment which are not strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. Underidentiﬁcation of an endogenous variable can be tested
by the Angrist–Pischke chi-squared statistic (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The values of the statistic we obtain are clearly against the
null of underidentiﬁcation of each of the three endogenous variables.
The Angrist–Pischke F statistic allows a test of weak identiﬁcation. This phenomenon arises when the correlation between the en-
dogenous variable and its instruments is not zero but small. Critical values for this test are not available. One possibility is theuse of the
Stock–Yogo (Stock andYogo, 2005) critical values for the Cragg–Donald F statisticwith one endogenous regressor. Thenull hypothesis
is that a given group of instruments isweak against the alternative that it is strong, under two deﬁnitions ofweak instruments: instru-
ments are weak if the bias of the IV estimator, relative to the bias of OLS, could exceed a certain threshold b; instruments are weak
if the conventional α-level Wald test based on IV statistics has an actual size that could exceed a certain threshold r. Interestingly,
Stock–Yogo critical values for LIML estimates are lower than those for GMM, reﬂecting greater robustness of the former method to
the presence of weak instruments. Applying the test to the endogenous variables in Table 6, we ﬁnd strong rejection of the null
with respect to GDP, while PRIVCRED and DEBT often lead to the rejection of the weak IV hypothesis. In this respect, Table 6 displays
the estimates of the Anderson–Rubin (Anderson and Rubin, 1949) test statistic that is robust to the use of weak instruments. The null
hypothesismaintains the coefﬁcients of the endogenous regressors are jointly equal to zero. The estimated values in Table 6 show that
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ciated with a glance at Table 7 that presents the ﬁrst stage estimation results. In particular, FINREFORM and other IVs enter the equa-
tions with signiﬁcant parameters, as expected.
One question which arises from the use of PRIVCRED as a proxy for household borrowing constraints is the inclusion of credit
channelled to the business sector. Although both components of private credit probably display similar temporal trends and high
cross-country correlation, the robustness of the results we obtained should be assessed through the use of data speciﬁc to household
credit. In this regard, we consider data on household credit (HOUSECRED) available for a cross-section of 44 countries over the period
1994–2005. Here, we apply again EC2SLS methods. The results are in Table 8. We estimate four models which include HOUSECRED
among regressors. The differences depend on the inclusion of DEBT and CHILDRENEXP among explanatory variables with effects
on the number of countries in the sample. When the endogenous variables are GDP and HOUSECRED the instruments are:
INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. To estimate models that assume GDP, HOUSECREDIT, and DEBT are endoge-
nous variables we use INFLATION, INFLATION squared, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM as IVs. The parameter of
HOUSECRED is again positive and precisely estimated, displaying an elasticity with respect to NRR in the range 20–30%. Hence, the
use of a better proxy for household credit provides a more realistic estimate of the effect of borrowing constraints on fertility. We
also provide a further test of the robustness of our results to model speciﬁcation with the estimation of an equation that includes
the share of government consumption in GDP (SHAREGOVCONS). Indeed, although our estimates take several forms of government
intervention into account, some could be missing and they could be approximated by SHAREGOVCONS. Data on SHAREGOVCONS are
from PennWorld Tables 8.0. The results of GMM and LIML within panel estimates are shown in the last two columns of Table 8. The
inclusion of SHAREGOVCONS is justiﬁed and the overall results are signiﬁcantly conﬁrmed. More in general, Table 8 shows howDEBT
enters all the speciﬁcations with signiﬁcant parameter estimates close to−0.10.
The complete econometric exercise not only highlights the importance of ﬁnancial development for the choice of the number of
children, but it also clariﬁes that the positive effect of released borrowing constraints exceeds the negative one due to more extensive
access to capitalmarkets. Hence,ﬁnancial development does seem responsible for a checkon thedeclining trendof fertilityworldwide.
4.4. Quantile regression
The picture obtained by the preceding set of estimations provides evidence that ﬁnancial development, proxied by PRIVCRED and
DEBT, does play a role in the determination of fertility. Nonetheless, it may be of interest to check the robustness of our estimates to
outliers andwhether the size of the estimated effects carries over thewhole distribution of fertility; this is alsomotivated by the priorTable 8
Robustness check.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.034 −0.023 0.046 −0.008 −0.384** −0.451**
(0.371) (−0.252) (0.491) (−0.080) (−2.342) (−2.330)
HOUSECREDIT 0.266*** 0.198** 0.305*** 0.226*
(3.133) (2.089) (3.269) (1.764)
SCHOOLINGFEM −1.095 −1.293 −1.279 −0.884 −3.490*** −3.644***
(−1.221) (−1.248) (−0.850) (−0.509) (−3.249) (−3.165)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0.812 0.931 1.095 0.450 3.731*** 3.946***
(0.911) (0.834) (0.728) (0.254) (3.201) (3.138)
URBAN −0.369* −0.258 −0.569** −0.420* −0.490* −0.467
(−1.760) (−1.211) (−2.325) (−1.680) (−1.717) (−1.536)
SSECURITY −0.004 −0.007* −0.001 −0.006 −0.003 −0.003
(−0.824) (−1.737) (−0.176) (−0.809) (−0.534) (−0.374)
DEBT −0.067** −0.096** −0.105*** −0.108***
(−2.029) (−2.075) (−2.839) (−2.612)
CHILDRENEXP 0.008 0.012
(0.164) (0.218)
PRIVCRED 0.368* 0.445*
(1.909) (1.924)
SHAREGOVCONS −0.384* −0.426*
(−1.857) (−1.886)
Statistics
Observations 106 81 94 69 108 108
Countries 41 37 35 31 44 44
R2 0.445 0.475 0.446 0.543 0.373 0.296
Hansen J
Statistic 12.697 7.153 14.878 13.928 3.040 2.885
p-Value 0.391 0.894 0.248 0.379 0.219 0.236
Notes—Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Bootstrapped Student's t in parentheses.Models 1–4 are estimatedwith EC2SLS,Model 5with GMM,Model 6
with LIML.Models 1 and 3 include as instruments for GDP andHOUSECREDIT: INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM.Models 2 and 4 include as instru-
ments for GDP, HOUSECREDIT, and DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. Models 5 and 6 include as instruments for GDP,
PRIVCRED, and DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, Log of TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. Temporal and regional dummies included. Statistical signiﬁcance as-
terisks: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 9
Quantile regressions.
Quantiles of the distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
SCHOOLINGFEM −0.914*** −0.795*** −0.839*** −0.841*** −0.698***
(−6.323) (−7.603) (−8.002) (−5.889) (−4.106)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0.765*** 0.695*** 0.775*** 0.812*** 0.664***
(5.014) (6.303) (7.006) (5.394) (3.704)
URBAN −0.259*** −0.261*** −0.255*** −0.249*** −0.261***
(−16.351) (−22.791) (−22.253) (−15.938) (−14.026)
SSECURITY −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.011***
(−11.382) (−17.010) (−16.497) (−11.773) (−9.263)
GDP 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.019** 0.006 −0.004
(3.684) (3.888) (2.400) (0.533) (−0.321)
DEBT −0.047*** −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.040*** −0.043***
(−7.488) (−9.703) (−9.676) (−6.427) (−5.832)
PRIVCRED 0.111*** 0.137*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.217***
(3.783) (6.410) (6.937) (5.172) (6.278)
Notes—Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Bootstrapped Student's t in parentheses. Temporal dummies included country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects partialled
out. Each column reports regression coefﬁcients for the given percentile of the dependent variable's distribution. Statistical signiﬁcance asterisks: * = 10%, ** = 5%,
*** = 1%.
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have transitioned to permanently low fertility because of unobserved variables. To address this issue, we employ a quantile regression
estimator (Koenker, 2005) on our panel of countries and account for theﬁxed effect component using the two-stepmethod suggested
by Fitzenberger (2012):
1. we regress the net reproduction rate on the standard set of regressors, including two dummies for temporal effects, using a FE-OLS
estimator; next, we subtract from the net reproduction rate the estimated ﬁxed effect;
2. we perform quantile regressions of the resulting variable on the standard set of regressors.
Finally, we bootstrap standard errors. The results for this exercise are displayed in Table 9 and substantially corroborate the pre-
vious econometric analysis based on conditional mean functions. The evidence suggests that, with the exception of URBAN,
SSECURITY, and DEBT, all regressors show a substantial degree of heterogeneity across the fertility spectrum. More speciﬁcally,
women's and men's schooling vary across quantiles without following any deﬁnite trend, while PRIVCRED and GDP follow a detect-
able pattern. The positive effect of PRIVCRED on fertility is relatively low (0.111) for the ﬁrst percentiles – the countries with low
fertility – whereas it doubles (0.217) at top fertility percentile. This result shows a very peculiar type of unintended consequences
of ﬁnancial development: interestingly, high fertility countries may see their fertility problems affected by ﬁnancial opportunities
more than low fertility countries.
More generally, we ﬁnd that the gradient of the effect of GDP is increasing across quantiles, going from 0.041 to a negligible
−0.004 (p= 0.749): this suggests that the negative role of income on fertility is larger in countries with very low fertility, whereas
this effect is very small in countries with very high fertility, probably because of the low degree of substitution between home- and
market-produced goods and opportunities. In sum, the quantile regression approach suggests that the commonly observed negative
relation between fertility and income is highly nonlinear and mediated by ﬁnancial markets.5. Final remarks
The objective of this paper was to investigate the role of ﬁnancial market imperfections in determining fertility using international
panel data. Our results appear useful to interpret themain trends observed in fertility in theworld in recent years: the declining num-
ber of children per woman is fundamentally caused by growing income and human capital and wider female participation in the la-
bour force. During this period, households' indebtedness is known (Harvey, 2004) to have sharply increased while ﬁnancial markets
further developed with a burst of innovation. According to our estimates, the development of ﬁnancial markets has positively inﬂu-
enced the fertility rate. Indeed, household behaviour has led to a signiﬁcant shift of resources in the life cycle from the later stages of
adulthood to the earlier ones. Greater debt has brought about an incentive to invest in children to compensate for the negative effects
on old-age consumption. Broader access to ﬁnancial investment has had an important income effect (negative) on fertility choice of
young adults. Hence, ﬁnancial development exercised signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the fertility choice of households but in two opposite
directions. In this respect, our paper highlights the powerful connections between ﬁnancialmarkets and fertility choices, substantially
overlooked in the existing literature, with an aggregate cross-country perspective.
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The case of no frictions
Let us consider the young adult optimization programme under the assumption of perfect ﬁnancial markets:max
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ð15Þwhere λu is the Lagrange multiplier. Let us consider the comparative statics effect of life-cycle wages on fertility, ((Eq. (16)):dnt ¼
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>>; ð16ÞwhereΔ andΔijdenote the determinant and the (i, j)-th cofactor of the borderedHessianmatrix of the problem, obtained deriving the
ﬁrst order conditions with regard to ct1, nt, ct + 12 , ct + 13 , ct + 23 , and λu. The second-order conditions for utility maximisation imply that
Δ b 0 and Δ22 N 0. Hence, the sign of the income effect depends on Δ62, whose expression is:Δ62 ¼−
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ð17ÞThe strict concavity of the utility functions u(⋅) and g(⋅) implies that the sign of Δ62 depends on the sign of the expression in
brackets on the second line of ((Eq. (17)), which is made of the difference of two terms. The one in parentheses is positive when chil-
dren are normal goods in themaximisation of v(ct1, nt). The term qt + 2(Rt + 1Rt + 2)−1 refers to the negative effect on fertility of larger
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come upon fertility: two are negative, one is positive. The comparative-statics effect of the gift qt + 2 on nt is given by:dnt
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The model with borrowing constraints
Under the assumption of binding borrowing constraints the utility maximisation programme becomes:max
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bð Þ c1t ¼ 1−τntð Þw1t þ Dt :By differencing the ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain the comparative statics effects of the exogenous variables on nt.
Higher credit availability will impact on household fertility according to the following expression:dnt
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; ð19Þwhere Γ and Γij denote the determinant and the (i, j)-th cofactor of the bordered Hessianmatrix of the problem. In this case, Γ N 0 and
Γ11 b 0 are required for the maximisation problem to reach an optimal solution, while it can be easily veriﬁed that Γ51 N 0:Γ51 ¼−
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Nowwe analyse themodel of household choice by assuming that the optimal desired value of saving st + 1 is higher than the ceil-
ing stþ1. Accordingly, the maximisation programme becomes:max
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bð Þ c3tþ2 ¼ Rtþ2st þ ntqtþ2:The reaction of a household's fertility to greater investment opportunities is given by:dnt
dstþ1
¼ 1
Φ
Φ52
Rtþ1
−qtþ2Rtþ2
∂2g
∂ c3tþ2
 2Φ22
 !
: ð21Þ
176 V. Filoso, E. Papagni / European Journal of Political Economy 37 (2015) 160–177whereΦ andΦij denote the determinant and the (i, j)-th cofactor of the bordered Hessian matrix of the problem. Among the second
order conditions for a maximum of the problem we have Φ N 0 and Φ22 b 0. In this expression, the term−qtþ2Rtþ2
∂2g
∂ c3tþ2
 2Φ22 b 0refers to the trade-off between the investment in children and that in ﬁnancial activities. The sign of the term is negative because
greater ﬁnancial investment opportunities reduce the need to raise children for old age consumption. The other component of the
effect of stþ1 on nt has the opposite sign of the income effect of wages, determined by the sign of Φ52. Below we show that Φ52 is
negative:Φ52 ¼−
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